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ABSTRACT
This study explores the relationship between corporate social
responsibility (C.S.R.) and financial performance of Indian firms.
We also examine the relationship between C.S.R. and financial
performance in context of Indian business group firms, which are
known to have unique characteristics which differ from those of
Indian stand-alone firms. Using a sample of Indian listed firms
between 2010 and 2015, we find that C.S.R., as measured by
E.S.G. disclosure score, has a U-shaped relationship with Tobin’s
Q, supporting the slack resource theory at lower level of CSR and
supporting the stakeholder theory at higher level of C.S.R. The
empirical results imply that an improvement in CSR actions does
not always result in higher firm value but should exceed a certain
level of C.S.R. to have a positive effect on firm value. In addition,
we find that at lower level, a negative relationship between C.S.R.
and Tobin’s Q weakens in group affiliate firms. However, this com-
plement effect of business group disappears at higher level,
weakening the positive relationship between C.S.R. and Tobin’s Q.
This study offers new insights for the different influence of busi-
ness groups on C.S.R. performance.
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Of late, corporate social responsibility (C.S.R.) has been considered a very important
factor in management. In particular, from the viewpoint of shareholder, the issue is
whether C.S.R. may serve to enhance corporate financial performance. In this context,
the relationship between C.S.R. and firm performance has been explored by many
authors (Waddock & Graves, 1997; Griffin & Mahon, 1997; Lin, Yang, & Liou, 2009;
Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, & Saaeidi, 2015). Numerous studies have attempted to
empirically examine these relationships. For instance, while one strand of literatures
suggests that C.S.R. has a positive impact on firm performance (Oeyono, Samy, &
Bampton, 2011), another strand shows that C.S.R. has a negative impact on firm per-
formance (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013). Moreover, these mixed results have led to
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extended studies on the relationship between C.S.R. and firm performance. However,
there are few empirical studies on how C.S.R. influences financial performance
in India.
Hence, to bridge the gap to the prior literature, this paper aims to investigate
whether C.S.R. influences the financial performance of Indian firms. The motivation
behind this research stems from the following three observations:
First, in general, while C.S.R. is high in developed countries that build economic
growth, it is less of a concern in developing countries. Among the emerging markets,
India has been quite proactive in taking up C.S.R. initiatives. The C.S.R. indicator of
Indian firms has rapidly increased. According to the Morgan Stanley Capital
International Emerging Markets E.S.G. index, Indian firms such as Infosys and
Housing Development Finance Corporation are among the top 10 firms with high
C.S.R. even though Indian firms generally exhibit lower levels of C.S.R. compared to
developed countries. Moreover, when one considers remarkable growth of emerging
markets such as India, an understanding on the relationship between C.S.R. and
financial performance is crucial for managers, investors and academics.
Unfortunately, C.S.R. research on Indian firms is limited mainly to the use of qualita-
tive research methods such as surveys and its C.S.R. policies (Sood & Arora, 2006).
Besides, the relevant literatures on the relationship between C.S.R. and financial per-
formance in India remain inconclusive.
Second, Indian business groups are known to have unique characteristics. Whereas
some authors suggest that business groups respond to market failures and high trans-
action costs (Gopalan, Nanda, & Seru, 2007), others argue that group-affiliated firms
perform worse than unaffiliated firms in India (Singh & Gaur, 2009). Gaur and
Kumar (2009) document that business group affiliation reduces the positive effect of
internationalisation on firm performance, underscoring disadvantage of business
group. Interestingly, in the perspective C.S.R., business groups in India have persisted
more with C.S.R. activities than have stand-alone firms. For instance, Indian firms
such as the Tata and Reliance groups are well known for their C.S.R. initiatives.
Hence, it is very meaningful to examine how the C.S.R. initiatives of Indian group-
affiliated firms differ from those of Indian stand-alone firms.
Third, Indian firms are facing external pressure such as mandatory regulation of
C.S.R. to behave responsibly toward C.S.R., which in turn may influence C.S.R. activ-
ities of Indian firms. Recently, India officially promulgated stimulus provision for
firms to engage in C.S.R. New C.S.R. regulations came into effect as of 1 April 2014.
Specifically, both domestic as well as foreign firms having their branches in India
should observe the C.S.R. legislation requiring them to contribute about 2% of their
net profits towards C.S.R. activities.1 This policy suggests that there has been a strong
push for Indian firms to adopt a more business model-based approach to C.S.R.
where the rationale for considering social and environmental is predominantly related
to firm value creation (Narwal & Singh, 2013; Muttakin & Subramaniam, 2015).
Hence, Indian case provides a unique case where the effect of change in C.S.R. activ-
ities on firm performance can be directly tested.
Main findings of this study are summarised as follows. First, this study finds that
the effect of C.S.R. on financial performance is nonlinear in Indian firms. Specifically,
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at the low level of C.S.R., Tobin’s Q decreases with C.S.R. while at the high level of
C.S.R., Tobin’s Q increases with C.S.R. More importantly, even after controlling for
firm specific variables, these empirical results still show significantly non-linear rela-
tionship. However, the effect of C.S.R. on R.O.A. is insignificant in Indian firms,
implying that the impact of C.S.R. is related to future firm value but not related to
accounting performance. Second, this study finds that the C.S.R. initiatives of group-
affiliated firms are higher than those of stand-alone firms but the relation between
C.S.R. and firm value is less pronounced in group affiliated firms than in stand-alone
firms. The results suggest that group affiliated firms are inclined to actively engage in
social activities to enhance group’s reputation. This study contributes towards the
extant C.S.R. literature by empirically examining the relationship between C.S.R. and
financial performance in India.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents literature
review. Sections 3 and 4 present hypothesis and test methodology. Section 5 presents
our empirical results on CSR and financial performance. Section 6 provides summary
and conclusion.
2. Literature review
There is an extensive literature on CSR and firm performance. Specifically, the exist-
ing empirical evidence regarding the relationship between CSR and firm performance
is mixed. The relationship between CSR and firm performance has been a dominant
theme in many papers (Alexander & Buchholz, 1978; Cochran & Wood, 1984;
Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield, 1985; McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988;
Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Tsoutsoura, 2004; Lin et al., 2009; Oeyono
et al., 2011).
For instance, Tsoutsoura (2004) documents that CSR has a significant positive
effect on firm performance in the S&P 500 firms during 1996–2000. He supports the
view that socially responsible corporate performance may be associated with a series
of bottom-line benefits. Oeyono et al. (2011) find that C.S.R. has a positive impact on
Indonesia’s top 50 firms. Lin et al. (2009) document that C.S.R. has a positive impact
on financial performance by analysing Taiwan’s 1,000 firms that consider their R&D
expenditures as one of their business strategies for sustainable development during
2002–2004. They suggest that while C.S.R. does not have a significant positive impact
on short-term financial performance, it offers a remarkable long-term fiscal advan-
tage. However, Smith, Yahya, & Marzuki Amiruddin (2007) document a negative
impact of C.S.R. on firm performance. Recently, literature examines the nonlinear
relationship between C.S.R. and firm performance. For example, Nollet, Filis, &
Mitrokostas (2016) examine the nonlinear relationship between corporate social per-
formance and return on capital of the S&P firms during 2007–2011. They find the
evidence of a U-shaped relationship between corporate social performance and
accounting based measures of financial performance.
Recent studies on C.S.R. and financial performance link in India remain inconclu-
sive. Mishra & Suar (2010) investigate whether C.S.R. influences firm performance in
India. They find that managers’ initiatives regarding C.S.R. have a positive impact on
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firm performance. Further, they argue that Indian firms should implement C.S.R. for
the benefit of their stakeholders. Rajput et al. Rajput, Batra, & Pathak (2012) docu-
ment that C.S.R. has a positive impact on financial performance. Padhi (2013)
observes that after C.S.R. has been categorised on the basis of government, firm, and
individual, it has a significant impact on firm performance. Kumar (2014) documents
that C.S.R. in India has a long-term view from late 1980s. He suggests that the phil-
anthropic ideas of Indian firms based on religious beliefs are similar to those of the
West. In particular, C.S.R. has been performed in various forms such as philanthropic
contribution to charity, service to local community, and an increase in employment.
C.S.R. activities can decrease firm’s earning in the short-term, but in fact contribute
to firm’s earnings in the long-term. More recently, Garg (2016) studies the relation-
ship between C.S.R. and performance in all those companies which are included in
the S&P B.S.E. C.A.R.B.O.N.E.X. Index for 10 financial years from 2004–2005 to
2013–2014 through P.R.O.W.E.S.S. database. He finds that C.S.R. impacts the value of
Indian corporate sector highly and significantly using panel regression. He suggests
that C.S.R. performance of companies impacts corporate performance not only for
current year, but also for the following years. Bihari and Pradhan (2011) suggest that
C.S.R. activities in Indian banks have positive impact on performance. However,
some authors find mixed results on the relationship between C.S.R. and financial per-
formance. For instance, Saxena and Kohli (2012) find that CSR in India has an insig-
nificant impact on firm performance in banking industry. Aggarwal (2013)
empirically examines the relationship between C.S.R. and financial performance, sug-
gesting mixed and inconclusive results.
Several studies have empirically examined the C.S.R. performance from business
group standpoint (Choi et al., 2018; Guo, He & Zhong, 2018). For example, Choi
et al. (2018) find that group affiliated firms in Korea is associated with higher C.S.R.,
while ownership disparity between cash flow and control by controlling insider share-
holders is associated with lower C.S.R., supporting opportunistic rent expropriation
theory. On the other hand, business group and a state-owned enterprise (S.O.E.) at
the same time have weaker C.S.R. performance, indicating that C.S.R. engagement is
a strategy for companies to pursue political justification in China. However, until
now it is not clear how C.S.R. affects financial performance in the business group.
3. Theoretical background and hypotheses development
3.1. Relationship between C.S.R. and financial performance
The stakeholder theory documents that treating and managing for stakeholder helps a
firm enhance value, that is, good for firm performance (Freeman et al., 2004;
Waddock and Graves, 1997). According to the instrumental stakeholder theory,
C.S.R. appears to be helpful to firms. That is, the satisfaction of various stakeholder
groups is instrumental for financial performance. Moreover, the stakeholder–agency
theory suggests that the implicit and explicit contract entailed by bilateral stakehol-
der–manager relationships serve as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms that
curb opportunistic behaviour by managers at the expense of other stakeholders (Hill
& Jones, 1992). Further, by addressing and balancing the claims of multiple
1780 W. S. KIM AND S. OH
stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995), managers can increase the efficiency of
their organisation’s adaptation to external demands (Orlitzky et al., 2003). As a strat-
egy, C.S.R. promotes a firm’s competitive advantage by weighing and addressing the
claims of various constituents in a fair and rational manner. For instance, firms may
improve their image, reputation and brand name through C.S.R. activities (Benito-
Hernandez, Platero-Jaime, & Esteban-Sanchez, 2016).
According to the slack resource theory, however, a company is able to carry
out its activities by the resources owned by the firm (Fauzi & Idris, 2009). Slack
resources are defined as the pool of resources in an organisation that is in excess
of the minimum necessary to produce a given organisation output (Nohria &
Gulati, 1996). Patten (2002) suggests that C.S.R. may lead to further consumption
of firm resources such as time, labour, and capital. Hence, firms may spend slack
resources in order to enhance C.S.R. activity. Specifically, a firm should hold a
good financial position to contribute to the corporate social performance. Further,
some authors argue that social activities involve financial costs and siphon off cap-
ital and other resources from firm (Aupperle et al., 1985; Preston &
O’Bannon, 1997).
According to the above arguments, the relationship between C.S.R. and firm per-
formance may have U-shape relation. In other words, an increase in C.S.R. may
make management resource more aggravated, thereby reducing financial performance.
Specifically, investments in C.S.R. may decrease financial slack.
On the contrary, however, an increase in C.S.R. may align with the shareholder as
well as stakeholders, thereby increasing financial performance. As indicated by
Kumar (2014), C.S.R. in India can contribute towards firm’s earnings enhancing the
firm’s reputation, brand value and interest convergence of stakeholders.
Taken together, as C.S.R. scores are at a lower level, C.S.R. investment costs may
be reflected immediately in firm performance but its benefits may not materialise.
Thus, we expect a negative effect of C.S.R. scores on financial performance at a lower
level, indicating that slack resource theory dominates at a lower level of C.S.R. scores.
However, as C.S.R. scores are above a certain level, C.S.R. investment costs may
increase marginally but its benefits may start being reflected in firm performance at
last, because C.S.R. investments have accumulated enough to start reaping the bene-
fits by improving firm’s image, reputation, and/or brand name. Thus, at a higher level
of C.S.R. scores, the relation between C.S.R. scores and firm performance may change
from a negative one to positive one, when C.S.R. investment benefits become greater
than its costs. Based on the above rationale, we hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between C.S.R. and financial performance is nega-
tive at a low level of C.S.R. scores and becomes positive at a high level of
C.S.R. scores.
3.2. Business groups and C.S.R.
Indian business groups are known to have unique characteristics. Business groups
play an important role in the Indian economy, and have been doing so during a
large part of the twentieth century (Kali & Sarkar, 2005). Indian business groups
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strive to serve their communities and the society at large, historically considering
social recognition. Indian business groups have persisted more with C.S.R. activ-
ities than have stand-alone firms. Group-affiliated firms intend to share the vision
and objectives of the group. Hence, their shared C.S.R. activities may result in the
enlargement of group’s C.S.R. Khanna & Yafeh (2007) indicate that group-affili-
ated firms are interested in group reputation for risk sharing. Furthermore,
Gopalan et al. (2007) argue that group-affiliated firms support financially dis-
tressed member firms in order to maintain the group’s reputation. In addition,
Choi et al. (2018) argue that C.S.R. can be used as a means of improving reputa-
tion capital to buffer the bad events.
According to these views, Indian group-affiliated firms share their C.S.R. activities
not only to increase group’s reputation but also to share risks and costs. On the other
hand, compared with stand-alone firms, group-affiliated firms may need more C.S.R.
investment costs and more time until they can reap the group’s C.S.R. benefits.
Cuervo-Cazurra (2018) argue that business groups may need higher costs as C.S.R.
activities increase, due to the rapid growth and diversification of business groups.
In sum, at a lower level of C.S.R. scores, C.S.R. investment costs may be shared
among group-affiliated firms, resulting in less negative effect of C.S.R. on financial
performance, compared with stand-alone firms. On the other hand, for group-affili-
ated firms, C.S.R. investment costs may still occur considerably until their C.S.R.
scores reach a certain level, resulting in less positive effect of C.S.R. on financial per-
formance than for stand-alone firms at a higher level of C.S.R. scores. Based on this
rationale, we hypothesise that:




To test the hypotheses, we use annual accounting data for all Indian firms listed on
the National Stock Exchange (N.S.E.) and Bombay Stock Exchange (B.S.E.) during
2010–2015. This study excludes the data offered by financial companies from the
sample, since the financial policy of such firms is often driven by regulatory aspects.
All data used are obtained from Bloomberg. The sample starts from 2010 owing to
limited environmental, social, and governance (E.S.G.) data. It excludes firms that
have either incomplete financial data or negative asset values. The sample includes
unbalanced panel 214 firms and 1,191 firm-year observations.
4.2. Research model
This article tests the hypotheses through t-tests and panel regressions and explores
the relationship between C.S.R. and financial performance in Indian firms. First, the
study uses a t-test to analyze the difference between the group affiliated firms and
stand-alone firms. Second, this study uses the panel regression model given in (1) to
test our hypotheses. We use this model to control for the time-invariant unobserved
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firm features that might be correlated with the explanatory variables in the model.
Third, as shown in Table 4, there is an endogeneity problem indicating that compa-
nies with a high financial performance can have a high C.S.R. performance. It is well
known that all of the pooled O.L.S., fixed effect and random effect models cannot
solve the endogeneity problem in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. Thus,
we use Arellano & Bond (1991)’s system generalised method of moments (G.M.M.)
to solve this problem. The G.M.M. estimation greatly reduces the bias problem. More
specifically, this study develops a model implied by Nollet et al. (2016):
FPit ¼ b0 þ b1ESGit þ b2ESG2it þ b3Leverageit þ b4Salegrit þ b5R&Dit
þ b6Lnassetit þ b7Profitabilityit þ b8Policydummyit þ ui þ eit
(1)
FPit is a firm financial performance indicator. This article uses two proxies for
firm financial performance (Yu-Shu, Chyi-Lin, & Altan-Uya, 2015). First, Tobin’s Q is
a proxy for firm value (Jo & Harjoto, 2011; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006). Tobin’s Q is
defined as the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the mar-
ket value of equity divided by the book value of total assets. Second, ROA is a proxy
for firm performance (McGuire et al., 1988). ROA is defined as net income divided
by the book value of total assets. In particular, Tobin’s Q is a variable that measures
firm value based on market value, and ROA is a variable that measures firm perform-
ance based on accounting data.
A formal definition of C.S.R. is the commitment of a business to contribute to sus-
tainable economic development, working with employees, their families, the local
community and society at large to improve their quality of life, which has been pro-
posed by the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. According to this
definition, C.S.R. has been considered as concept including environment, employee,
community, and shareholder. ESG is the key variable to measure C.S.R., which is
approximated by the Bloomberg’s E.S.G. disclosure (Nollet et al., 2016). E.S.G. breaks
it into three components: Environmental, Social and Governance. Environ, Social and
Gov are variables to measure Environmental, Social and Governance of companies,
respectively. In particular, E.S.G. is a proprietary Bloomberg score based on the extent
of a company’s E.S.G. disclosure. The score ranges from 0.1 for companies that dis-
close a minimum amount of E.S.G. data to 100 for those that disclose every data
point collected by Bloomberg. Each data point is weighted in terms of importance,
with data such as greenhouse gas emissions carrying greater weightage than other dis-
closures. The score is also tailored to different industry sectors. In this way, each
company is only evaluated in terms of the data that is relevant to its industry sector.
Specifically, based on the previous studies (Jo & Harjoto, 2011), we assume E.S.G.
affects Tobin’s Q.
In addition, square term of ESG is a proxy to examine nonlinear relationship
between C.S.R. and financial performance. Financial risk (Leverage), Sales growth rate
(SaleGr), Research and Development (R&D), Firm size (Lnasset), Profit (Profitability)
serve as control variables. Leverage is a proxy variable that analyzes the impact of
financial distress costs, and is measured as total debt divided by total assets. SaleGr is
a proxy variable for growth rate. R&D is measured as R&D divided by assets. Firm
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size (Lnasset) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Profit (Profitability)
is measured as the earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets.
Furthermore, since we expect that new law on C.S.R. policy may influence firm per-
formance from 2013, we include a Policydummy variable, which takes the value of 1
during the new law enforcement period (i.e. 2013–2015) and zero otherwise. The par-
ameter ui denotes the unobservable heterogeneity or the firm’s unobservable individ-
ual effects, controlling for the particular characteristics of each firm. Finally, eit
denotes the random disturbance.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. On
average, Tobin’s Q is about 0.739 (0.482 at the median), implying that the market
value of listed Indian non-financial companies is lower than the book value. The
average ROA is 0.047, with a standard deviation of 0.071 and a median of 0.040. ESG
is 19.126 (17.355 at the median), on average, with a standard deviation of 8.203.
Environ is 12.858 (10.853 at the median), on average, with a standard deviation of
8.982. Social is 15.588 (12.281 at the median), on average, with a standard deviation
of 12.718. Gov is 46.038, on average, with a standard deviation of 5.669 and a median
of 44.643. Interestingly, E.S.G. scores of Indian firms are lower than those of devel-
oped countries. For example, E.S.G. scores of the U.S., the U.K., Germany, France
and Japan firms are 31.28, 31.15, 32.89, 40.61 and 32.30, respectively (Zuraida,
Houqe, & Van Zijl, 2016).
Table 2 shows E.S.G. statistics for Indian listed companies. The second and the
fourth columns in Table 2 show that E.S.G. and Social scores increased from 21.836
to 22.358 and from 13.819 to 21.676, respectively from 2010 to 2015. However,
Environ and Gov scores decreased from 14.691 to 12.542 and from 46.328 to 46.019,
respectively, from 2010 to 2015. Overall, for Indian firms, E.S.G. increases, but
responsibility on environment and governance decreases. Namely, increase of C.S.R.
in Indian firms seems to be mainly caused by a rapid increase of their social respon-
sibility. More specifically, in 2013, E.S.G. increased sharply, but in 2015, E.S.G.
decreased rapidly. These results suggest that government’s attempts to enhance CSR
are not effective.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Max. Min.
Tobin’Q 1261 0.739 0.482 0.677 2.983 0.020
ROA 1261 0.047 0.040 0.071 1.139 0.710
ESG 1261 19.126 17.355 8.203 50.000 11.157
Environ 1031 12.858 10.853 8.982 51.938 1.550
Social 967 15.588 12.281 12.718 73.438 3.125
Gov 1261 46.038 44.643 5.669 71.429 10.714
Leverage 1261 0.200 0.168 0.165 0.985 0.000
Salegr 1250 0.234 0.136 1.489 49.897 1.000
R&D 1261 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.116 0.000
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Table 3 reports Pearson correlation coefficients for dependent and independent
variables. Most of the control variables are significantly correlated with Tobin’s Q or
ROA at 1% significant level. In particular, Tobin’s Q and ESG show a significantly
positive correlation (0.117). And Tobin’s Q shows a significantly positive correlation
(0.079, 0.142, 0.138) with Environ, Social, and Gov, respectively. Tobin’s Q and
Leverage show a significantly negative correlation (-0.214), which means firm value
decreases when it increases financial leverage. R&D shows a significantly positive cor-
relation (0.152) with Tobin’s Q while Salegr shows an insignificantly negative correl-
ation (-0.021) with Tobin’s Q. ROA and Tobin’s Q show a significantly positive
correlation (0.367). ROA and ESG show a significantly a positive correlation (0.152).
In addition, the correlation matrix shows that there are no high correlations between
independent variables, indicating the absence of a multicollinearity problem.
5.2. Preliminary test
5.2.1. Comparison between high C.S.R. firms and low C.S.R. firms
This section examines whether the means of variables differ significantly between
high C.S.R. and low C.S.R. firms. A parametric t-test is used for the comparison of
the means. High C.S.R. and low C.S.R. firms are classified by the average of ESG. In
Table 4, the average Tobin’s Q for high C.S.R. firms is 1.749, significantly higher than
1.100 for low C.S.R. firms. In addition, the average ROA for high C.S.R. firms is
0.082, significantly higher than 0.048 for low C.S.R. firms. It indicates that high
C.S.R. firms have higher performance and value. Furthermore, high C.S.R. firms have
insignificantly higher Salegr and R&D (0.006) compared to low C.S.R. firms.
5.2.2. Comparison between group-affiliated firms and stand-alone firms
In this section, we investigate whether the means of variables differ between group-
affiliated and stand-alone firms through a parametric t-test. In Table 5, we divide the
Table 2. Change of ESG.
Year ESG Environ Social Gov
2010 21.836 14.691 13.819 46.328
2011 22.462 15.217 15.250 46.635
2012 22.848 15.176 16.871 47.183
2013 24.349 16.487 20.312 47.503
2014 24.730 16.692 21.666 47.188
2015 22.358 12.542 21.676 46.019
Table 3. Correlation analysis.
Tobin’s Q ROA ESG Environ Social Gov Lev Salesgr R&D
Tobin’s Q 1
ROA 0.367 1
ESG 0.117 0.152 1
Environ 0.079 0.161 0.959 1
Social 0.142 0.093 0.884 0.762 1
Gov 0.138 0.180 0.803 0.726 0.640 1
Leverage 0.214 0.657 0.039 0.053 0.022 0.001 1
Salegr 0.021 0.007 0.015 0.027 0.006 0.016 0.005 1
R&D 0.152 0.099 0.065 0.053 0.071 0.061 0.133 0.015 1
Notes: Significant at: p< 0.05, p< 0.01.
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sample into two groups, namely, group-affiliated and stand-alone firms. The average
ESG disclosure scores for group-affiliated firms is 25.687, significantly higher than
21.926 for stand-alone firms. In addition, this study examines sub-component
(Environ, Social and Gov) of ESG. The average disclosure scores of Environ, Social
and Gov for group-affiliated firms are 17.768, 21.682 and 48.494, significantly higher
than 13.898, 16.803 and 46.105 for stand-alone firms, respectively. More specifically,
disclosure score of Social shows the highest difference among sub-component, sug-
gesting that group-affiliated firms hold higher financial resources than those of stand-
alone firms. These are similar to the results of group firms and non-group firms in
Korea (Choi et al.,2018), being different from the results of group firms and non-
group firms in China (Guo et al., 2018). Interestingly, the average Tobin’s Q for
group-affiliated firms is 1.072, significantly lower than 1.384 for stand-alone firms,
indicating that group-affiliated firms have lower growth opportunity than that of
stand-alone firms.
5.2.3. Panel unit root test
Before a panel regression analysis, we perform a panel unit root test to identify
whether all variables in the model are stationary. If one of the variables used in the
estimation is nonstationary, not only the result of estimation has a spurious regres-
sion problem, but also the estimated parameters might be biased. In order to avoid
the spurious regression problem, all the variables need to be stationary in the estima-
tion. The null hypothesis of non-stationary versus stationary in each variable is tested
Table 5. Comparison between Group-affiliated firms and Stand-alone firms.
Group-affiliated firms Stand-alone firms
Variables N Mean(a) N Mean(b) Difference (a-b) p-value
ESG 390 25.687 795 21.926 3.761 0.000
Environ 390 17.768 795 13.898 3.870 0.000
Social 390 21.682 795 16.803 4.879 0.000
Gov 390 48.494 795 46.105 2.388 0.000
Tobins’Q 390 1.072 794 1.384 0.312 0.006
ROA 390 0.058 794 0.058 0.000 0.996
Leverage 390 0.204 794 0.174 0.030 0.016
Salegr 390 0.163 789 0.206 0.043 0.456
R&D 390 0.004 794 0.005 0.002 0.112
Notes: Significant at: p< 0.1 (t> 1.64), p< 0.05 (t >. 1.96), p< 0.01 (t>. 3.29).
Table 4. Comparison between high CSR firms and low CSR firms.
High CSR firms Low CSR firms
Variables obs mean (a) obs mean (b) Difference (a-b) p-value
Tobins’Q 322 1.749 868 1.100 0.649 0.000
ROA 322 0.082 868 0.048 0.034 0.000
ESG 322 38.128 869 17.607 20.520 0.000
Environ 322 30.904 869 9.328 21.576 0.000
Social 322 38.196 869 11.142 27.054 0.000
Gov 322 54.480 869 43.989 10.492 0.000
Leverage 322 0.176 868 0.186 0.010 0.442
Salegr 322 0.251 857 0.169 0.082 0.182
R&D 322 0.006 868 0.004 0.002 0.112
Notes: Significant at: p< 0.1 (t> 1.64), p< 0.05 (t >. 1.96), p< 0.01 (t>. 3.29).
1786 W. S. KIM AND S. OH
using the group mean panel unit root test (Cheng, Liu, & Chien, 2010). We employ
two different panel-based unit root tests, the Levin-Lin-Chu ADF (L.L.C.) (Levin, Lin,
& Chu, 2002) and the Im-Pesaran-Shin PS ADF (I.P.S.) (Im, Pesaran, & Shin, 2003),
to investigate the null hypotheses of unit roots of all the variables chosen in the mod-
els. Table 6 shows the results of panel unit root tests. The nulls of unit roots are all
rejected, which indicates that all the variables are stationary. Thus, we perform a
panel regress analysis.
5.2.4. Hausman specification test
Hausman specification test is used to determine which one of the alternative panel ana-
lysis methods such as fixed effects model and random effects model is more adequate
in the panel regression model. Concerning this, H0 hypothesis suggests that “random
effects exist” and H1 hypothesis suggests that ‘random effects do not exist’. Table 7
shows that H0 hypothesis is rejected for the model, at the significance level of 1%, thus
all of the individual effects in the models are not random, but fixed. In other words,
fixed effects model is more effective than random effects model. Consequently, the
panel data regression is analysed by the fixed effects model in this study.
5.3. CSR and firm performance
This section examines how CSR affects firm performance through a panel regression
model and G.M.M. estimation. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 8 show the fixed effects
panel regression results for the effects of ESG and ESG2 on firm performance.
Column (1) indicates the relationship between CSR and Tobin’Q is U-shaped, sup-
porting Hypothesis 1. In particular, the coefficients of ESG and ESG2 show -0.023
(t¼-2.159) and þ0.0003 (t¼ 1.698), respectively. When ROA is used as the variable
for firm performance, column (3) does not show the U-shaped relationship with no
statistical significance. The coefficients of ESG and ESG2 are -0.00002 (t¼-0.008) and
-0.00001(t¼-0.027), respectively. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 8 show the G.M.M.
Table 6. Panel unit-root test.
Variables
LLC IPS
t-statistic p-value t-statistic p-value
Tobin’Q 54.703 0.000 12.339 0.000
ROA 33.034 0.000 7.259 0.000
ESG 79.952 0.000 9.262 0.000
Environ 39.940 0.000 4.230 0.000
Social 10.851 0.000 4.122 0.000
Gov 7.914 0.000 4.826 0.000
Leverage 121.705 0.000 38.677 0.000
Salegr 260.326 0.000 32.672 0.000
R&D 75.230 0.000 13.693 0.000
Notes: ,  and  indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.
Table 7. Hausman Specification Test.
Test Summary Chi-square statistics Chi-square statistics degrees of freedom p-value
Cross-section random 82.102772 7 0.000
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 1787
estimation results for the effects of ESG and ESG2 on firm performance. They also
indicate the relationship between C.S.R. and firm performance is U-shaped. The coef-
ficients of ESG and ESG2 on Tobin’s Q in column (2) are -0.029 (t¼-3.296) and
þ0.001 (t¼ 3.694), respectively, both being significant at 1% level. However, the coef-
ficients of ESG and ESG2 on ROA in column (4) are -0.0006 (t¼-0.353) and 0.00001
(t¼ 0.331), respectively, both being insignificant.
Therefore, we conclude that C.S.R. has a U-shaped relation with Tobin’s Q in Indian
firms, supporting Hypothesis 1. However, C.S.R. is not related to such accounting
measure as ROA. Furthermore, for the average level of E.S.G. at 19.126 (from Table 1),
the total effect of ESG on Tobin’s Q is -0.023 19.126þ 0.0003(19.126)2¼ -0.330.
Even for the maximum level of E.S.G. at 50 (from Table 1), the total effect is also nega-
tive, indicating that the overall effect of ESG on Tobin’s Q is negative. Thus, we con-
clude that although Hypothesis 1 is supported, the overall effect of C.S.R. on firm
performance is still negative even at high level of C.S.R.
In addition, Leverage has a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA,
suggesting that financial risk has a negative effect on firm performance. Policydummy
has a significantly negative impact on Tobin’s Q and ROA in G.M.M. estimation. All
models are statistically significant and the adjusted R-squared is typically in the
range 0.365–0.804.
5.4. Group effect on the relationship between C.S.R. and financial performance
In this section, we investigate the relationship between C.S.R. and firm performance
of business group affiliated firms compared to that of stand-alone firms. Table 9
Table 8. CSR and financial performance.
Tobin’s Q ROA
FEM GMM FEM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.864 0.744 0.291 0.232
(6.447) (5.061) (3.711) (3.354)
ESG 0.023 0.029 0.00002 0.0006
(2.159) (3.296) (0.008) (0.353)
ESG2 0.0003 0.001 0.00001 0.00001
(1.698) (3.694) (-0.027) (0.331)
Leverage 0.330 1.047 0.169 0.081
(2.671) (9.824) (7.762) (3.888)
Salegr 0.010 0.017 0.00001 0.00001
(1.501) (1.651) (-0.418) (-0.206)
R&D 0.354 11.340 0.181 0.112
(-0.187) (6.740) (-0.537) (-0.393)
Lnasset 0.177 0.012 0.019 0.014
(4.370) (1.209) (2.591) (2.157)
Profitability 2.215 4.547
(8.354) (15.327)
Policy dummy 0.026 0.103 0.015 0.020
(1.096) (3.259) (3.568) (5.704)
Fixed effects Yes No Yes No
Total obs. 1,277 1,241 1,277 1,241
Adjusted R2 0.804 0.365 0.427 0.522
F-statistics 19.033 4.287
J-statistics 1232 957
Notes: Significant at: p< 0.1 (t> 1.64), p< 0.05 (t >. 1.96), p< 0.01 (t>. 3.29).
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reports the results of a panel regression model and G.M.M. estimation with respect to
the joint effect between C.S.R. and business group on firm performance. In columns
(1) and (2) of Table 9, C.S.R. and C.S.R. squared show significantly negative and
positive relationships with Tobin’s Q, respectively, confirming our previous results in
Table 8. Furthermore, we use an interaction term (E.S.G.  Group dummy) to exam-
ine the role of business group on the relationship between C.S.R. and firm perform-
ance. Column (1) of Table 9 shows an insignificantly positive effect on the
relationship between E.S.G.  Group dummy and Tobin’s Q, which is inconsistent
with hypothesis 2. However, consistent with hypothesis 2, Column (2) of Table 9
shows the interaction terms with business group (E.S.G.  Group dummy and
E.S.G.2  Group dummy) have significantly positive and negative coefficients,
respectively. On the other hand, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9, all the coefficients
of C.S.R., C.S.R. squared and the interaction terms between business group and
C.S.R. are statistically insignificant, except C.S.R. coefficient of column (3) that is sig-
nificant at 10% level.
6. Conclusion
Prior empirical studies have examined the relationship between C.S.R. and firm per-
formance, but the evidence presented is mixed. This paper explores the relationship
between C.S.R. and financial performance in Indian firms listed on the N.S.E. and
Table 9. Group effect on relationship between CSR and financial performance.
Tobin’s Q ROA
FEM GMM FEM GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.001 0.738 0.102 0.125
(6.729) (4.819) (6.179) (8.238)
ESG 0.030 0.035 0.002 0.002
(3.304) (3.835) (1.787) (1.579)
ESG2 0.001 0.001 0.00002 0.00001
(3.926) (4.365) (1.005) (0.796)
ESG  Group dummy 0.006 0.009 0.00022 0.0004
(1.459) (2.264) (0.392) (0.831)
ESG2  Group dummy 0.0001 0.0003 0.000004 0.00001
(1.532) (2.397) (0.227) (0.602)
Leverage 1.037 1.107 0.132 0.124
(9.781) (10.100) (11.050) (11.031)
Salegr 0.017 0.015 0.000 0.001
(1.620) (1.471) (0.300) (0.577)
R&D 11.596 0.018 0.506 0.446
(6.673) (1.694) (2.522) (2.461)
Lnasset 0.005 10.904 0.004 0.006
(0.537) (6.405) (4.005) (5.762)
Profitability 3.724 4.414
(12.970) (14.740)
Policy dummy 0.133 0.108 0.020 0.023
(4.163) (3.360) (5.521) (6.782)
Fixed effects No No No No
Total obs. 1,277 1,209 1,277 1,241
Adjusted R2 0.328 0.361 0.166 0.204
F-statistics 63.333 29.313
J-statistics 1,198 1231
Notes: Significant at: p< 0.1 (t> 1.64), p< 0.05 (t >. 1.96), p< 0.01 (t>. 3.29).
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B.S.E. from 2010 to 2015. This article examines whether improved C.S.R. actions
result in higher firm performance in India.
The main findings of the article are as follows. First, when controlling for firm
specific characteristics, it has a U-shaped relationship (negative and positive) between
C.S.R. and Tobin’s Q, supporting Hypothesis 1. However, the relationship between
C.S.R. and R.O.A. is not significant. The results indicate that the effect of C.S.R. is
related to long-term oriented firm value while it is not related to short-term oriented
accounting performance. Further, this result implies that market measures such as
Tobin’s Q prove to be better predictors of C.S.R. performance than accounting-based
measures such as R.O.A., which is different from the empirical results documented
by McGuire et al. (1988). Unique characteristic of Indian firms on C.S.R. may cause
the difference. C.S.R. in India has its origins in merchant and religious groups that
were beneficial to the local community, focusing on community development (Jose,
Bandi, & Mehra, 2003). Moreover, C.S.R. of Indian firms has roots in history as well
as philanthropy. For example, prior to Independence in 1947, Indian firms made sig-
nificant contributions to schools, hospitals, and towards rural development (Mohan,
2001). After Independence, large public firms undertook C.S.R. activities. As indicated
by Sharma (2011), Indian firms consider C.S.R. as a charitable cause and an ethical
commitment. Kansal, Joshi, & Batra (2014) suggest that corporate reputation has
been observed to be a significant factor that influences the social disclosures made by
Indian firms. In this context, C.S.R. performance of Indian firms may be a long-term
investment for growth and development.
Second, we find that at lower level, the negative relationship between C.S.R. and
financial performance weakens in group affiliate firms than in stand-alone firms,
while at higher level, the positive relationship weakens in group affiliate firms than in
stand-alone firms, consistent with Hypothesis 2. This shows implies that C.S.R.
engagement in business group mitigates a negative effect of C.S.R. on financial per-
formance at low level of C.S.R. scores. The empirical results suggest give deeper
insights for capital market to grasp the different impact of business groups on C.S.R.
performance.
This paper contributes to the literature on C.S.R. as well as on corporate finance.
Specifically, the study contributes to C.S.R. literature in that the relationship between
C.S.R. and financial performance is examined empirically through E.S.G. scores
in India.
Note
1. The new C.S.R. law states that it is mandatory for firms to spend 2% of their average net
profits of the last three financial years on specified C.S.R. activities provided they fulfill at
least one of the following financial strength criteria during any financial year: net
worth> INR 5 billion (i.e., around US$80 million), or turnover> INR 10 billion (i.e.,
around US$160 million), or net profits> INR 50 million (i.e., around US$800,000).
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